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We analyze how economy-wide forces (i.e.shocks to terms of trade, technology and
endowments) aﬀect the intensity of social conﬂict. We see conﬂict phenomena such as
crime and civil war as involving resource appropriation activities. We show that not
all shocks that could make society richer will reduce conﬂict. Positive shocks to labor
intensive industries will diminish social conﬂict, while positive shocks to capital inten-
sive industries will increase it. The key requirement is that appropriation activities be
more labor intensive than the economy. Our model can explain the positive association
between crime and inequality, and the curse of natural resources; it predicts that aid
in kind to war-ridden societies will have perverse eﬀects, and oﬀers guidance on how to
integrate international trade policy and peacekeeping eﬀorts. Including appropriation
activities into a canonic general equilibrium model introduces a social constraint to
policy analysis. Thus, we can also account for populist policies, apparently ineﬃcient
redistribution and “national development strategies”.
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Keywords: conﬂict, civil war, crime, social constraint, populism, trade policy, inef-
ﬁcient redistribution.
∗We thank Rafael Di Tella, Herschel Grossman, Juan Carlos Hallak, Ben Hermalin, Daniel Heymann,
Edward Miguel, and participants in various conferences and seminars.
11 Introduction
One crucial aspect of social life is the conﬂict over the distribution of resources. The divi-
sion of wealth among individuals is not solely determined by a price system operating on
the basis of well deﬁned and perfectly enforced property rights. In reality, expropriatory
eﬀorts play an important role, and take various forms. Sometimes an agent will engage in
criminal activities—either acting alone or as part of a group—with the undisguised intention
to expropriate goods from others. Some other times individuals may join a guerrilla that is
motivated by ideology, but that in fact is (at least partly) fueled by the group’s ability to
appropriate resources.
Economics has historically analyzed phenomena like crime, on the one hand, and revolts
and political instability, on the other, along separate lines.1 These phenomena, however,
recognize a common root: they are symptoms of social conﬂict in the sense that they express
individual and group pressures for the appropriation of resources. This paper oﬀers a simple
general equilibrium framework to study how economy-wide forces aﬀect the extent of social
conﬂict seen as an appropriation-based phenomenon.2
Both microfounded theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that, all else equal,
a lower opportunity cost in terms of wages in the labor market should increase the chance
that an individual engages in activities such as rebellion or crime.3 This knowledge alone,
however, is not suﬃcient to predict how aggregate economic shocks or policy interventions
will aﬀect the extent of social conﬂict. One key reason is that usually all else is not equal:
real life shocks aﬀecting the opportunity costs of conﬂict also tend to aﬀect the returns to
conﬂict and viceversa. Our model provides an integrated view of how the costs and beneﬁts
to conﬂict activities move in response to shocks (or policies). Thus, we can make predictions
on how such shocks will aﬀect phenomena like crime, and account for stylized facts of civil
wars.
1Classic references in the literature on crime are Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). Various references to
work on revolts are given below.
2Whether the ﬁght for resources takes the form of atomistic criminals or large, politically organized
factions will depend on many factors shaping what we could call the industrial organization of social conﬂict.
In this paper we choose to abstract from all issues regarding the number and size of competing groups, as well
as from strategic interactions, to focus on what we deem to be more basic aspects, such as the determinants
of the relevant costs and beneﬁts to the expropriatory eﬀorts.
3There is evidence that a higher income per capita is associated with a lower likelihood of civil conﬂict
(Collier and Hoeﬄer, 1998, Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002, Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel, Satyanath and
Sergenti, 2004), and MacCulloch (2001) ﬁnds that higher household income diminishes the propensity to
express support for a revolt. Empirical studies on the relationship between wages and crime suggest that
higher wages deter participation in criminal activities (see Grogger, 1998 and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard,
2002).
2In particular, our model shows that wealth-increasing shocks may both increase and
decrease conﬂict. What really matters in our model is the relative factor intensity of the
sectors in the economy that are initially aﬀected. Our general equilibrium model of a small
open economy comprises two productive sectors and a third sector we call “appropriation.”
This last sector expropriates a fraction of what is produced in the two productive industries.
Assuming that appropriation is labor intensive relative to the whole economy, we show that
an exogenous increase in the price of the capital intensive good will cause the appropriation
sector to expand. (Conversely, a decrease in that price or an increase in the price of the labor
intensive good will lead to a smaller appropriation sector.) The reason is that an increase in
the price of the capital intensive good will expand the capital intensive industry, and contract
the labor intensive one. This makes labor relatively less scarce, resulting in a lower cost of
the appropriation activity relative to the amount of appropriable resources. Technological
progress, which makes society richer, has similar eﬀects: neutral technical progress in the
labor intensive sector will decrease conﬂict but progress in the capital intensive sector will
increase it. The eﬀects of changes in endowments can also be analyzed: an increase in
the capital endowment, for instance, will increase conﬂict. We also show that the social
backlash of appropriation activities can be so strong that shocks that would make a conﬂict-
free economy richer will leave everybody worse oﬀ.
The model is useful to explain empirical patterns in crime and civil wars. First, it can
account for the positive association between crime and inequality.4 Capital and labor in our
model can be interpreted to represent diﬀerently skilled labor forces. Any favorable shock to
the skilled labor intensive sector will increase the wage gap across skill levels and will increase
conﬂict whenever appropriation is relatively intensive in unskilled labor. Also, in our model
these movements are compatible with an increase in total production. Thus, our model can
explain why reforms that increase income per capita may be associated with increasing crime
and inequality. An example is that of Argentina, where sweeping market-friendly reforms
where introduced starting in 1991.5
The model can also account for stylized facts of civil wars that appear paradoxical. On the
one hand, there is the abovementioned evidence that a higher income per capita is associated
with a lower likelihood of conﬂict. On the other hand, however, not all wealth-increasing
forces appear to diminish conﬂict: Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998) report that a larger availability
4Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002) document this connection across countries. There is also
evidence that income inequality increases individual propensity to express support for a revolution (see
MacCulloch, 2001).
5The following years saw important increases in income per capita, inequality and crime in the country.
GDP per capita increased by 40% between 1991 and 1998. The Gini coeﬃcient went from 44.7 to 49.5
between 1992 and 1998, and crimes against property increased by roughly 71% between 1991 and 1998.
3of natural resources can increase the risk and duration of civil war. Our model can explain
these patterns. It predicts that a shock such as a drought—a negative shock to agricultural
productivity and income—will fuel conﬂict in countries where agriculture uses relatively little
capital, as in Subsaharan Africa (see Miguel et al, 2004). But our model also predicts that
technical progress or new reserve discoveries in oil or diamonds will increase conﬂict when
these extractive industries are relatively capital intensive, regardless of the fact that these
shocks should also increase income.
Over the last few decades, the development of Political Economics has allowed us to
incorporate political constraints into theory and policy analysis. In a similar spirit, our
framework brings a social constraint to bear on the analysis of economic policy. We ﬁnd
that taxing capital and subsidizing productive labor can make both workers and capitalists
better oﬀ: although capitalists lose when paying taxes they may gain more from less intense
expropriation. When administering such tax-subsidy schemes is diﬃcult (weak states may
have trouble identifying who is really doing productive work), the promotion of unproduc-
tive public employment can be Pareto-improving. Thus, some forms of populism, including
redistribution through wasteful channels, can be accounted for as rational responses to envi-
ronments with social conﬂict.6 Similarly, policy interventions that shield the economy from
certain shocks to terms of trade and technology may become desirable. Such interventions
can include (i) trade protection of labor intensive industries and (ii) subsidizing techni-
cal progress in labor intensive industries while discouraging the adoption of foreign-based
innovations that might be biased towards the capital intensive sector. These results may
help rationalize the political support often enjoyed by policies that protect labor intensive
industries. They also resonate with proposals by development theorists aligned with the
Latin American structuralism (see for example Prebisch, 1959, on how national development
strategies could use selective interventions).
The policy applications of the model reach the international eﬀorts to stop violent con-
ﬂict in the third world. One implication of our model is that aid in kind may have perverse
eﬀects, because it does not aﬀect the returns to labor, but it increases the mass of lootable
resources. Also, peace eﬀorts may need to be coordinated with international trade agree-
ments. Otherwise, the trade policies chosen by industrial powers may undermine their peace
eﬀorts abroad. To the best of our knowledge, our model provides the ﬁrst framework with
which to analyze the integration of trade and peace policies.
Our approach abstracts from several factors that may aﬀect conﬂict. Examples are income
eﬀects, unemployment, and additional connections between natural resources and conﬂict.7
6See Coate and Morris (1995) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) for diﬀerent explanations of ineﬃcient
redistribution mechanisms.
7Extractive activities, for example, tend to be associated with monopolic rents. These in turn are as-
4Previous papers on conﬂi c t( s e ef o ri n s t a n c eG a r ﬁnkel, 1990; Grossman, 1991; Skaperdas,
1992; Hirshleifer, 1995; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001b; Powell,
2004) have studied a variety of problems we do not deal with. Examples are the determinants
of military expenditures in repeated interactions among countries, the failure of cooperation
in set ups where coercion is possible, and the determination of investment in production
versus oﬀensive and defensive capabilities.
Our model can be thought to have implications for rent-seeking. In particular, our
appropriation sector could be thought to capture rent-seeking eﬀorts under exogenous tariﬀs
(on this topic, see for instance Krueger, 1974; and Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1980). Besides
diﬀerences in focus and modeling choices, our theory diﬀers from Kruger’s and Bhagwati and
Srinivasan’s in that our theory reserves a role for the relative use of factors across industries.
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes
the equilibrium after proving its existence. Then a comparison is made with the equilibrium
in a conﬂict-free society. Section 4 studies how economic shocks aﬀect the extent of social
conﬂict, thus establishing our central results. Section 5 establishes further results and dis-
cusses policy implications. Section 6 extends the basic model to the case of industry-speciﬁc
factors. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy comprising two productive sectors along the lines of the canonical 2x2
international economics model.8 The productive sectors involve many ﬁrms which maximize
proﬁts and use technologies characterized by constant returns to scale. In a competitive
equilibrium proﬁts are driven to zero. The two productive sectors or industries are labeled 1
and 2, and they use two inputs, capital and labor, respectively labeled K and L.A l lﬁrms in
each industry share the same production function with the property that industry 1 is more
capital intensive than industry 2. W ed e n o t ew i t hr and w the respective rental prices of
capital and labor. The given primitives of the model are: the factor endowments, available in
ﬁxed amounts K and L; the technologies; and the prices of output, which are internationally
determined and are labeled p1 for industry 1, and p2 =1for industry 2. (Good 2 is the
numeraire.)
In addition to the productive sectors, there exists an appropriation sector. This sector
sociated with higher corruption, and the latter can be expected to damage the quality of institutions and
economic performance. The end result may well be higher conﬂict. For the connection between rents and
corruption see Ades and Di Tella (1999), and for the role of institutions see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001). Ross (2003) lists various connections between natural resources and conﬂict.
8See Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and Jones (1965).
5only uses labor (LA) and produces a redistribution of output from the productive industries
towards the appropriation sector.9 The technology of appropriation is summarized by the




≤ 1. The function A(LA)
speciﬁes the fraction of the total production value that is appropriated when LA units of
labor are devoted to expropriatory activities. The concavity assumption reﬂects congestion
eﬀects in appropriation. Given production levels q1 and q2 in the two industries, and LA
units of labor devoted to appropriation, the amount appropriated is A(LA)[p1q1 + q2].G i v e n
that under constant returns to scale payments to factors exhaust the value of production,
the appropriated amount can be written as A(LA)
£
rK + w(L − LA)
¤
. One can interpret
that appropriation targets factor owners and steals a fraction of their returns. Also it can
be interpreted that a fraction of their endowments is stolen. Alternatively, one can imagine
that appropriation targets the output or revenues of ﬁrms. In any case, r and w represent
the gross (before appropriation) rental prices of capital and labor in the productive sectors.
We assume that the appropriated output is distributed uniformly among all labor involved
in the appropriation sector. Given that there is free entry into the appropriation sector, the
amount of labor in this sector is determined by the equality of the average appropriation
and the opportunity cost to appropriation (the net wage).
An important clariﬁcation is due: our model abstracts from all loses that expropriatory
activities may cause by way of destruction of life and property. Incorporating those is
straightforward and would not aﬀect our results.
3 The equilibrium
In this section we characterize conditions for existence of an equilibrium with appropriation
in our economy. We then describe this equilibrium and compare it to that in an economy
where social conﬂict is absent.
For most of the analysis it is useful to deﬁne the minimum unit-cost requirements of
inputs in each industry: aij is the amount of input j used to produce one unit of output i
at minimum cost (given r and w).
We focus on equilibria without productive specialization (i.e. both q1 and q2 are pos-
itive).10 Given the technology, output prices (p1) and factor endowments (K and L), the
9The extreme assumption that the appropriation sector uses no capital is made for simplicity only. The
necessary and suﬃcient condition for our results to emerge is that the appropriation sector be more labor
intensive than the overall economy. This allows for appropriation being less labor intensive than the labor
intensive industry. See the appendix for a demonstration.
10Our results involving changes in output prices and technical change go through even under specialization.
The results on endowments, on the other hand, are speciﬁc to the no specialization cone.
6equilibrium of the model determines the rental price of factors (r and w), the output pro-
duction levels (q1 and q2), and the utilization of factors in each sector (K1, K2, L1, L2 and
LA).
T h r e es e t so fc o n d i t i o n sm u s tb es a t i s ﬁed in a competitive equilibrium. First, ﬁrms in
the productive industries must earn zero proﬁts:
ra1K + wa1L = p1 (1)
ra2K + wa2L =1 . (2)
Second, the market for factors must clear:
q1a1K + q2a2K = K (3)
q1a1L + q2a2L = L − LA. (4)
Third, a no arbitrage condition must hold, in the sense that labor must obtain similar




rK + w(L − LA)
¤
=[ 1− A(LA)]w. (5)
This last condition merely says that the payoﬀ from appropriation (the value of appropriated
goods per unit of labor deployed to expropriation) must equal the returns from work net
of appropriation losses. The former is captured by the left hand side in equation (5): the
average productivity at appropriation is
A(LA)
LA [p1q1 + q2], which equals the left hand side
in virtue of constant returns to scale in the productive industries. The opportunity cost
to appropriation is the net return to productive labor, given by the right hand side. This
expression is obvious in the case that appropriation targets factor owners, but also applies
to any of the other interpretations given before.11
This formulation captures a competitive situation where labor owners can deploy their
eﬀorts in the appropriation sector, either individually, or in groups that share evenly the
11In the case when it is the output of ﬁrms that is targeted, the value of production available for repaying
factors will be aﬀected by the same coeﬃcient. The reader might wonder whether the existence of appro-
priation should aﬀect the ﬁrst two equations in the system, which appear exactly as in the canonic model
without appropriation. Firms would obtain net prices aﬀected by a factor 1 − A(.) in the right hand side,
and we would get some other equilibrium factor prices ˆ w,ˆ r. Now note that the unitary input requirement
coeﬃcients are homogeneous of degree zero in factor prices. Then, because the system (1)-(2) has a unique
solution, we must have ˆ w =( 1− A)w and ˆ r =( 1− A)r.A l lf a c t o r s1 − A disappear, and we are left with
the same ﬁrst pair of equations.
7proceeds from appropriation. Similar results are obtained in the case where appropriation
is not characterized by competition but rather by monopoly.12
3.1 Existence
Proposition 1 If there exists an equilibrium without specialization for the economy with-
out appropriation and A(L) is suﬃciently small, then there is also an equilibrium without
specialization for the economy with appropriation.
Proof. Note that LA does not appear in equations (1) and (2). Thus, the existence of
an appropriation sector does not aﬀect the gross rental price of factors unless it results in











other words, the amount of LA that solves equation (5) should be small enough (say LA is
below some level we label b L). Simplifying equation (5) we have that A(LA)= w
rK+wLLA.I f
A(0) = 0,L A =0is an equilibrium, and whenever A0 (0) > w
rK+wL there is also an equilibrium
with posistive LA determined by the intersection of A(LA) with w
rK+wLLA.I f A(0) > 0
equilibrium is unique and LA is positive. If A(L) is suﬃciently small the interior solution
satisﬁes LA < b L, given that A(LA) is increasing, and the economy does not specialize.
In the remainder of the paper we focus on the interior solution for LA.
3.2 Comparison of economies with and without conﬂict
The economies with and without an appropriation sector can be easily compared. In the case
of no specialization that we focus on, the existence of an appropriation sector does not aﬀect
the absolute gross rental prices of factors. These are solely determined by the characteristics
of productive technologies, and the amount of labor engaging in appropriation is residually
determined in equations (3) to (5) so that the market for factors will clear and no one will
gain by reallocating labor units across activities.
The presence of appropriation activities, however, does aﬀect the rental prices net of
appropriation that factor owners actually receive. In fact, the existence of an appropriation
sector hurts all agents, including those who go into the appropriation sector.
12In this case we could think that the monopolic appropriation entrepreneur hires labor and must pay each
unit the equivalent to the (net of appropriation) wage they can earn in the productive industries [1−A(LA)]w.
The revenues for the monopolist are A(LA)
£
rK + w(L − LA)
¤
, so he will choose LA to maximize proﬁts,
yielding an analog to equation (5): A0 (LA)(rK+wL)=w. The resulting model yields identical comparative
statics results to those we show in this paper.
8Proposition 2 The existence of the appropriation sector makes the owners of capital and
labor worse oﬀ.
Proof. If there is no specialization, the rental price of factors are the values of r and w
that solve equations (1) and (2). Then, total incomes to capital and labor without an ap-
propriation sector are rK and wL, respectively. With appropriation without specialization,
the gross rental prices of factors do not change but the net rental prices are respectively
(1 − A(LA))r and (1 − A(LA))w. Therefore, total incomes to capital and labor with an
appropriation sector are (1 − A(LA))rK and (1 − A(LA))wL, respectively.
The possibility that workers may become criminals or warriors poses a paradox, in that
they will end up worse oﬀ than if they could commit not to leave productive activities. In
this sense, workers play a prisoner’s dilemma when making their career decisions.13
In addition, appropriation aﬀects the relative importance of the productive sectors in the
economy.
Proposition 3 The existence of the appropriation sector increases the production of the
capital intensive good and reduces the production of the labor intensive good.
Proof. I ft h e r ei sn os p e c i a l i z a t i o n ,t h er e n t a lp r i c eo ff a c t o r sa r et h ev a l u e so fr and
w that solve equations (1) and (2). These determine the values of a1K, a2K, a1L and a2L in
equations (3) and (4). Given the amount of factors available for production (K and L−LA)
these equations determine the levels of production in the two productive industries. It can




















This proposition is an application of Rybczynski’s (1955) theorem, and it tells us that
the presence of conﬂict enlarges the capital intensive sector. This has implications for the
empirical study of the connection between conﬂict and natural resources. In countries where
extractive industries are relatively capital intensive, they could account for a larger share of
economic activity as a consequence—and not a cause—of conﬂict. As will be shown below, our
13Of course, with productive specialization, the existence of an appropriation sector would result in an
increase in the wages paid by ﬁrms. If this increase is greater than the “appropriation tax”, workers would
be better-oﬀ with the existence of the appropriation sector.
9model also predicts a causality eﬀect going in the opposite dicrection: shocks that enlarge
extractive, capital intensive activities will increase conﬂict. This two-way causation poses a
challenge to empirical work trying to estimate the impact of natural resource availability on
conﬂict.
4 Shocks and the intensity of social conﬂict
We study now how changes in the parameters of the model aﬀect the level of conﬂict. We
ﬁrst study changes in output prices.
4.1 Changes in the terms of trade
Changes in the price of commodities aﬀect the rental price of factors. In an economy with
an appropriation sector, this eﬀect is the same as in an economy without an appropriation
sector.
Lemma 1 (Stolper and Samuelson) An increase of the price of the capital intensive output
results in an increase in the rental price of capital and a decrease in the rental price of labor ³
dr




Proof. Diﬀerentiating equations 1 and 2 and using the envelope theorem it is straight-










This fundamental result of international economics is key to two of the central results of
this paper, captured in propositions 4 and 5.
Proposition 4 An increase in the price of the capital intensive output results in an increase






Proof. The equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector can be written as A(LA)=
1
r
wK+LLA. The conditions for the implicit function theorem are satisﬁed, so we can write LA












The denominator is negative from the concavity of A(LA) and the equilibrium condition
in the appropriation sector. Then,
dLA
dp1 has the sign of
d( r
w)
dp1 ,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v eb yL e m m a1
(Stolper-Samuelson).
10T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i sr e s u l ti sa sf o l l o w s . T h ek e yi d e ai st h a tt h el e v e lo fc o n ﬂict in
our model responds to a balance between the opportunity cost of expropriatory activities
and the value of potentially expropriable resources (as captured in the right and left hand
sides of equation (5), respectively). An increase in the price of the capital intensive good
expands the capital intensive sector while the labor intensive sector contracts. The latter
sector releases more labor per unit of capital than the former sector can absorb at the initial
factor prices. This can be thought to make labor a relatively less scarce good, lowering
wages. This lowers the opportunity cost of the appropriation activity compared with the
size of potentially lootable resources, thus leading to more conﬂict. The way this result
arises from the model can be easily explained by means of Figure 1. A little manipulation of
equation (5) shows that the amount of labor in the appropriation sector is determined by the
intersection of the concave function A(LA) with the linear function 1
r
wK+LLA.B yL e m m a1 ,
an increase of p1 r e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s eo fr and a decrease of w. This, in turn, leads to a






Figure 1: Prices and conﬂict
4.2 Changes in Technology
Technical progress unambiguously increases society’s ability to create wealth. However, there
are instances in which technical change will increase conﬂict.
Proposition 5 Neutral technical progress in the capital intensive sector results in an in-
crease in social conﬂict.
Proof. Consider a neutral technical innovation that makes the capital intensive sector
1+θ t i m e sm o r ep r o d u c t i v e( θ>0). This implies that the zero proﬁt condition in that
11sector can now be written as: ra1K + wa1L =( 1+θ)p1. Therefore, technological progress
in the capital intensive sector has the same eﬀect on r and w as an increase of the price of
the capital intensive good. The proposition then follows from Proposition 4.
Analogously, neutral technical progress in the labor intensive sector results in a decrease
in social conﬂict. Note that the result that technical change will increase conﬂict does not
rely on such change being of a labor-saving kind, which would of course yield the result more
easily. Innovations can lead to more conﬂict even when being neutral.
4.3 Changes in factor endowments
Another source of variation in conﬂict levels may arise from changes in the amount of avail-
able factors. In particular, we might be interested in how a higher capital endowment will
aﬀect conﬂict.





Proof. Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector with respect












. The denominator is negative from the concavity of
A(LA) and the equilibrium condition in the appropriation sector. Then,
dLA
dK > 0.
The explanation for this proposition is thus. Because in the no specialization case factor
prices are only aﬀected by technology, a higher availability of capital will not aﬀect the op-
portunity cost to the appropriation sector. However, an economy with more capital produces
more, so the amount of lootable resources increases, making appropriation more proﬁtable.
This results in an increase in the level of conﬂict. An analogous result can be obtained when
considering the role of foreign aid to a society with high levels of conﬂi c t .A i di nk i n dd o e s
not aﬀect the returns to productive labor, but, just like an increase in capital, it enlarges
the amount of lootable resources. This, in turn, provides incentives for appropriation to
increase.
Studying the eﬀect of changes in the total endowment of labor requires that we redeﬁne
the appropriation technology so as to consider both the amount of labor in the sector and
in the rest of the economy. When performing changes in the labor endowment, it seems
more reasonable to postulate that appropriation is a function of the share of the overall
labor force—rather than the absolute number of people—that are devoted to such activity
(we can consider our previous formulation as including a normalization). Otherwise, as the
population of a country grows, the appropriation sector would grow as well up to the point
in which it takes over the whole economy. We then deﬁne appropriation as a function of the
share of labor in the appropriation technology, i.e. A(lA) where lA =
LA
L .





Proof. The equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector can be written as A(lA)=
L
r
















The explanation of the previous proposition stated that, given w and r, more capital
leads to more lootable resources and hence to more appropriation. It would seem that this
logic should extend to the case of labor as well, explored in the last proposition. However,
when L increases the product does not increase as much (capital is being held ﬁxed), so the
appropriable resources per person go down. This causes the level of conﬂi c tt og od o w n .
5 Further results and applications
In this section we study how the existence of conﬂict introduces a social constraint to policy
analysis. We ﬁrst examine how subsidies to workers in the productive sectors, ﬁnanced with
taxes to capitalists, can reduce the level of social conﬂict and enlarge the total value of
production in the economy. We then explore the use of unproductive public employment to
attain the same objective. We analyze next the policy implications of our proposition that
technical progress in the capital intensive industry will increase conﬂict. We show that this
increase in conﬂict can be as large as to make everybody worse oﬀ, so certain policies aﬀecting
the adoption of technical innovations might be justiﬁed. Finally, we examine a rationale for
trade policy intervention, both from a domestic and an international perspective. The results
of this section help explain how certain policy reforms that appear Pareto-improving in a
frictionless model may be rendered ineﬃcient by the social backlash to policy in a conﬂictive
world. Once the social constraint is incorporated to policy analysis, policies that seem
distortionary may instead be Pareto-improving. This is of course but an instance of the
theorem of the second best: in the presence of a distortion, another distortion may improve
matters. In our model, the distortion is given by the presence of expropriatory activities.
The policies rationalized in this section—taxing capital to subsidize labor, promoting public
employment, protecting labor intensive industries, intervening in the process of technology
adoption—ﬁt the populist stereotype. The results in this section suggest that such policies
could emerge as a rational response under conﬂict, rather than as the result of clientelism,
corruption, or a sheer taste for redistribution.
135.1 Taxes and social conﬂict
Consider a tax-subsidy scheme such that workers in the productive sectors receive a subsidy
equal to a fraction s of the wage ﬁrms pay to them. To fund these subsidies, capitalists
p a yat a xe q u a lt oap r o p o r t i o nt of the rent to capital. Given taxes t and subsidies s,t h e
equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector becomes:
A(LA)
£
rK + w(L − LA)
¤
=( 1− A(LA))(1 + s)wLA. (6)
In addition we ask that the government keep a balanced budget:
sw(L − LA)=trK. (7)
The model is completed with equations (1) to (4).
Proposition 8 Giving a subsidy to productive labor reduces the level of conﬂict
¡dLA
ds cs=0 < 0
¢
.
Proof. The equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector can be written as A(LA)=
wLA+(1−A(LA))swLA
rK+wL .D i ﬀerentiating this condition with respect to s, and evaluating the ex-
pression at s =0 , we obtain:
dLA
ds (s =0 )=
(1−A(LA))wLA
A0(LA)(rK+wL)−w. The denominator is negative
from the concavity of A(LA) and the equilibrium condition in the appropriation sector with-
out subsidies. Then,
dLA
ds (s =0 )< 0.
The intuition for this result is direct. Subsidizing productive labor increases the oppor-
tunity costs of engaging in appropriation, thus reducing the latter. A subsidy to productive
labor results in a shift of labor away from appropriation activities and towards the productive
sectors of the economy. Therefore, the tax-subsidy scheme has a positive eﬀect on the total
amount of output in an economy with an appropriation sector. This provides an eﬃciency
rationale for a set of policies that are usually considered solely redistributive: subsidies to
productive labor increase the total size of the economy’s “pie.” If lump sum taxes and trans-
fers were possible, then our tax-subsidy scheme would be Pareto optimal, because the total
value of production could be increased while making sure capitalists are being left at least as
happy as before paying any taxes. When dealing with the issue of social conﬂict, however, it
may not be appropriate to assume that all transfers among agents are possible. For example,
i tm i g h tb ei m p o s s i b l et ot a xt h ea g e n t si nt h ea p p r o p r i a t i o ns e c t o r .
If we restrict ourselves to the case in which the government can only tax and subsidize
agents in the productive sectors, the issue of the Pareto optimality of subsidies to productive
labor becomes more complicated. We must study the eﬀects of this policy in the net wages
and rental price of capital. It is straightforward to see that a subsidy to productive labor
a l w a y sm a k e sw o r k e r si nt h ep r o d u c t i v ei n d u s t r i e sb e t t e ro ﬀ.T h es u b s i d y h a st w oe ﬀects,
141) it has a direct positive eﬀect in the gross total wage, and, 2) it reduces the appropriation
sector and hence the expropriation suﬀered by workers. Both eﬀects go in the same direction,
increasing the net income of workers. Those in the appropriation sector must also be better
oﬀ given that in equilibrium they are indiﬀerent regarding their career decisions. In the case
of owners of capital, the two eﬀects go in opposite directions: under the tax-subsidy scheme,
1) they pay a tax, but 2) the “appropriation tax” diminishes. If the second eﬀect overcomes
the ﬁrst, we have that the proposed scheme makes both workers and capitalists better oﬀ.
We now show by example that there are economies where the tax-subsidy scheme proposed
a b o v ei sP a r e t o - i m p r o v i n g .
Example 1 Taxes, subsidies and social conﬂict in a Cobb-Douglas economy:






1 for the capital intensive






2 for the labor intensive sector. Let us set the total endowments of
the two factors of production at levels K = L =1 0 0 . In this example we characterize the
equilibrium both for the case without an appropriation sector (LA =0 )a n dt h ec a s ei nw h i c h
there is an appropriation sector with the following technology: A(LA)=
LA
150+LA.I n t h e
latter case we consider both the situation with no intervention (s = t =0 ) and a situation
with state intervention through a tax-subsidy scheme. In this case, we consider a subsidy
to productive labor of 10% (s =0 .1), which is funded through a tax on capital. The public
budget is balanced in equilibrium.
Figure 2 shows the output combinations that can be obtained in equilibrium for the dif-
ferent cases. The graph coincides with the production possibility frontier for the economy



















Figure 2: Equilibrium output pairs
without an appropriation sector (given the Pareto optimality of equilibria). That is not the
case under social conﬂict, where the set of production pairs that can be obtained is to the
15south-west of the pairs for the economy without social conﬂict. The existence of social con-
ﬂict introduces a wedge between what it is technically feasible and what can be obtained in
equilibrium. Interestingly, a subsidy to productive labor moves the set of production pairs
under conﬂict toward the ones without conﬂict. In fact, the subsidy allows for the total elim-
ination of conﬂict in some cases, making both graphs coincide in the left upper part of the
ﬁgure (when p1 is relatively small).
While subsidies to productive labor make all workers better oﬀ, that is not necessarily the
case with owners of capital. Figure 3 shows the net income of capital (net of government
taxes and appropriation losses, labeled with “NIK”) as a function of p1 for the three diﬀerent
scenarios (LA= 0 ,s = 0 ,s = 0 . 1 ) .T h eﬁgure shows that social conﬂict results in a lower income
for capitalists. For relatively high levels of p1, and given the existence of the appropriation
sector, capitalists are better oﬀ with a subsidy to productive labor (and a tax to capital) than
without it.


























Figure 3: Net income of capital
5.2 Unproductive public employment
The tax-subsidy scheme introduced in the last subsection could be vulnerable to fraud. For
example, an individual could appear in the ﬁrm’s payroll and split the subsidy with the
ﬁrm, while the individual is in fact comitting crimes rather than working. When the state
is weak to stop such fraud, the scheme proposed above may be ineﬀective. An alternative
for reducing conﬂict can be public employment. To the extent that it prevents individuals
from devoting time to conﬂict activities, public employement (even when unproductive per
se) can be a way to reduce the appropriation sector.
Suppose the state announces the employment of a ﬁx number of public employees LP,
w h ow i l le a r naw a g ewP >w . Those that are not employed by the state must then decide
between work and conﬂict. The state wage payments wPLP m u s tb ef u n d e dw i t hat a xo n
16capital rents at rate t.T h e m o d i ﬁed model now contains equations (1) to (4), where (4)
now reads q1a1L + q2a2L = L − LA − LP, and two more conditions. One is the equilibrium
condition for the appropriation sector, which now is,
A(LA)
£
rK + w(L − LA − LP)
¤
=( 1− A(LA))wLA, (8)
and the other one is the government’s balanced budget condition.
wPLP = trK. (9)
We can now state,






Proof. F a c t o rp r i c e sa r ed e t e r m i n e db ye q u a t i o n s( 1 )a n d( 2 )s ot h e ya r et h es a m ea s
in the basic model. Rearranging equation (8) we get A(LA)=
LA
r
wK+L−LP .D i ﬀerentiating









< 0, where the inequality
follows from the denominator being negative. This follows from (8) and the concavity of
A(.).
The proof just given corresponds to the no specialization case, where the main eﬀect
of public employment is reducing the amount of wealth that can potentially be disputed.
The proposition, however, is also true for the specialization cases, where public employment
also causes an increase in wages. This raises the opportunity costs of conﬂict, reducing
appropriation even further. The extension just analyzed assumes that public employment is
totally unproductive. Our result suggests that clientelistic practices that transfer income to
target groups through public employmen tm a yh a v eaf a v o r a b l eb y p r o d u c t .
It can be shown by example that the reduction in conﬂict brought along by public em-
ployment can more than compensate its costs in terms of forgone production. Hence, the
promotion of unproductive employment can be Pareto-improving. The economics literature
has investigated the rationale for ineﬃcient transfers to special interests. Coate and Morris
(1995) oﬀer an explanation on the basis of asymmetric information about two elements: the
usefulness of policies and the motivations of politicians. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a)
oﬀer an explanation based upon the possibility that ineﬃcient mechanisms may enlarge the
target group and consolidate its power. This subsection yields an alternative explanation.
When the targetting of subsidies to productive labor is diﬃcult, the promotion of unproduc-
tive labor can be attractive to society as a way to diminish conﬂict.
175.3 First world technological progress and third world conﬂict
One would think that developing nations will be helped by technology transfers from rich
nations: better technologies expand the production possibility frontier and make a country
unambiguously richer. However, if developed nations are more capital intensive than devel-
oping ones, the innovations the former make available to the latter might be biased towards
the capital intensive industry. The problem with the adoption of such innovations is that, as
shown in Section 4, neutral technical progress in the capital intensive industry will increase
conﬂict. Moreover, the increase in conﬂict can overcome the direct eﬀect of technical progress
on the production possibilities of the economy, resulting in a decrease in total production.
As shown in the example below, the decrease in production can be so signiﬁcant that even
c a p i t a l i s t sa r ew o r s eo ﬀ by the adoption of a technological innovation in the capital intensive
sector. Firms in the capital intensive sector have incentives to adopt a better technology
and make proﬁts. In equilibrium, all ﬁrms in the sector adopt the improved technology and
make zero proﬁts. The impact on factor prices increases conﬂict, and this increase can be as
strong as to leave all owners of labor and capital worse oﬀ.
Example 2 Technological progress and conﬂict:






1 for the capital intensive






2 for the labor intensive sector, and the following appropriation technology:
A(LA)= 3
260 + 1
260LA. Let us set the total endowments of the two factors of production
at levels K = L = 100 and let p1 =1 . Figure 4 shows the total value of production in the
economy for diﬀerent levels of technological progress (θ) in the capital intensive sector. While
an increase of 5% in the productivity of sector 1 results in an increase of total production,
further increases actually have a negative eﬀect on the total production of the economy.











Figure 4: Technological progress and total production
18Figure 5 (below) shows the net incomes of capital and labor (labeled NIK and NIL respec-
tively). Technical progress in the capital intensive sector hurts labor. There are two reasons
for this: ﬁrst, technical progress in the capital intensive sector reduces the gross wage paid
by ﬁrms; second, there is an increase in the appropriation losses brought by the increase in
conﬂict. The two forces work in diﬀerent directions for capitalists. While technical progress
in the capital intensive sector results in an increase in the gross rental price of capital, it
also results in an increase in the appropriation they suﬀer. Figure 5 shows that the second
eﬀect overcomes the ﬁrst one for relatively high rates of technical progress. As a result, both
w o r k e r sa n dc a p i t a l i s t sa r em a d ew o r s eo ﬀ by technical progress.


























Figure 5: Technical progress and payments to factors.
The example suggests that developing nations with serious conﬂict issues may not want
to adopt every technological improvement that richer countries make available to them,
even if these come as a gift. In addition, a conﬂict-prone society may want to discourage
innovation in the capital intensive sector, while encouraging it in the labor intensive sector.
This course of action and the trade policies analyzed in the following subsection mirror the
interventions proposed by Latin American structuralists (see for instance Prebisch, 1959)
and other advocates of state-guided “national development strategies”.
5.4 Trade policy intervention and social conﬂict
Domestic trade policy in the small economy
Here we explain how trade policy intervention in the small open economy can reduce
social conﬂict, and how this intervention can be Pareto-improving. Imagine a country that
19is a net importer of goods produced in its labor intensive industry, and is a net exporter
of goods produced in its capital intensive industry. Our Proposition 4 indicates that social
conﬂict can be diminished through a raise in the price of the labor intensive good and a
decrease in the price of the capital intensive good. Therefore, if the government desires to
attain a reduction in conﬂict, it might consider imposing a tariﬀ on imports. This protection
will increase the price that domestic producers in the labor intensive sector can obtain for
their goods, causing the expansion of the sector, an increase in wages, and a drop in social
conﬂict. A reduction in social conﬂict can also be attained by taxing the exports of the
capital intensive sector. In the converse case that the country is a net exporter of labor
intensive goods, and a net importer of capital intensive goods, a government that wishes to
diminish conﬂict would impose subsidies on both the labor intensive exports and the capital
intensive imports.
In the previous subsection we showed that an improvement in the technology of the
capital intensive industry can trigger an expansion of appropriation that is so high that
everybody would be better oﬀ i ft h eg o v e r n m e n tf o u n dm e a n st op r e v e n tt h ea d o p t i o no f
the improved technology. Note also that in our model the eﬀect of neutral technical change
is formally equivalent to a change in output price. This means that if a trade policy can
aﬀect the prices perceived by producers, then there must be trade interventions that make
everybody better oﬀ. For concreteness, think of a trade intervention that lowers the producer
price of the capital intensive good (a tax if the country is a net exporter of it, and a subsidy
if it is a net importer). This intervention has the opposite eﬀect to neutral technical progress
in the capital intensive industry. Therefore, such trade policy will raise welfare whenever
technical progress in the capital intensive industry leaves everybody worse oﬀ.
International trade policy and social conﬂict
In recent years the world has seen signiﬁcant international policy eﬀorts at preventing,
controlling, and ending armed conﬂict. The peace keeping branch of the UN, for example,
carries initiatives in a large number of countries. Some of these—notably some countries
in Africa—have been involved both in interstate and civil conﬂicts where appropriation is
widely known to play an important role.14 These peace keeping eﬀorts face a signiﬁcant
obstacle in that the options to looting may not abound, thus making the decision to join
14The pervasive presence of appropriation of goods and even human beings in the context of Africa’s
civil wars is well documented. Mentions to looting and banditry in oﬃcial documents are ubiquitous.
An example is provided by the UN Secretary-General’s report S/1997/80, on 26 January 1997 (available
at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/UnamsilR.htm>). Therein the Secretary-General stated how
thousands of village hunters were being recruited to defend villages “against looting from both the RUF and
undisciplined RSLMF elements.” (RUF means Revolutionary United Front and RSLMF means Republic of
Sierra Leone Military Forces.)
20a guerrilla or to abuse a position of military authority more attractive. In the words of
the UN Secretary-General regarding Sierra Leone, "As economic opportunities in the formal
sector decline, people have little choice but to participate more fully in the informal economy,
including resorting to acts of banditry." 15 In this connection, economic development is seen
as a potentially powerful antidote to conﬂict.
On the other hand, both Western democracies by themselves and the global community as
represented by the UN pursue development eﬀorts in the Third World, which include a trade-
related dimension. Organizations such as the UN’s Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and the United Kingdom’s Direction for International Development (DFID) are
spearheads to various initiatives that seek to help developing countries increase their exports
to richer nations. However, the policies discussed in the context of trade and development
strategies are never linked to the initiatives that the same set of actors pursue regarding
peace keeping. Our model suggests that they should be connected, and how.
To see this, suppose we view access to ﬁrst world markets for, say, processed agricultural
products, as an improvement in the price for processed agricultural goods produced in a
Subsaharan economy. Now suppose those goods are relatively labor intensive in the latter
economies. Then our model predicts that better access to European markets for those goods
would cause the labor intensive sector in Subsaharan economies to expand. This would
make labor relatively scarcer in the latter economies, raising wages and diminishing conﬂict
in Subsaharan Africa. Unfortunately, less developed countries face signiﬁcant barriers to the
markets in developed countries. Moreover, these tariﬀs are biased against less technology
intensive exports (see Meller, 2003).
It follows from our model that when the possibility of lower protection to ﬁrst world
agriculture is discussed within the World Trade Organization, its beneﬁts in terms of lower
conﬂict in Africa might have to be taken into account. At the same time, higher European
tariﬀs, subsidies and sanitary barriers to agricultural products may entail costs in terms of
more painstaking peace eﬀorts. Our model also warns that export oriented strategies as
pursued by UNCTAD and DFID might have to focus on the fact that not every income-
enhancing change may reduce conﬂict. Fostering the expansion of labor intensive industries
could constitute a pacifying force. But the expansion of extractive, more capital intensive
activities (that happen to attract signiﬁcant Western involvement), on the contrary, may
instead fuel conﬂict. See our discussion on “conﬂict diamonds” in the next section.
15See report S/1995/975, 21 November 1995, by the UN Secretary-General in
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/UnamsilR.htm.
216C o n ﬂict and factor speciﬁcity
One might think that the predictions of our model are unrealistic in the short run, when
some factors of production are ﬁxed. For example, one might expect the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem to fail: a positive shock to the price of oil could generate an increase in wages—rather
than a decrease—even when oil extraction is a relatively capital intensive sector. But if more
valuable natural resources will raise wages, can we still account for the curse of natural
resources, whereby the availability of more valuable natural resources increases conﬂict? If
anything, it would seem that such phenomen o nm u s tb ee x p l a i n e dw i t ham o d e lt h a ti s
compatible with delivering higher conﬂict and higher wages when, say, the price of a natural
resource goes up. In this section we attain precisely this explanation. We study the well
known Ricardo-Viner model with industry-speciﬁc factors and add the appropriation sector.
Therefore, the model is as in section 3, with the diﬀerence that while labor is still mobile
across sectors, capital is not. There are two kinds of capital (K1 and K2)w h i c ha r es p e c i ﬁc
to each productive industry. The respective endowments of capital are denoted with K1 and
K2. The model with industry speciﬁc factors can be thought to capture short run movements
(when capital is ﬁxed), while our basic model in section 3 can be thought to capture long
run eﬀects (when all factors are mobile).
The Ricardo-Viner model has the property that any positive shock to a price increases
wages. We show that natural resource shocks that raise wages are indeed compatible with
higher, rather than lower, levels of conﬂict. The key aspect is that when extractive activities
are relatively capital intensive, a shock to the price of natural resources will expand the
returns to appropriation even more than it increases its opportunity costs.
Note that when there are industry speciﬁc factors of production, the deﬁnition of a sector
as “labor intensive” is not too meaningful if one sticks with the deﬁnition used before, in
terms of unit input requirement ratios. In the modiﬁed setup, we follow convention by saying
an industry is relatively labor intensive when the participation of labor in that industry’s
income is relatively high. As is standard in the literature, let σi denote the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital in sector i (a negative number), and θLi ≡
wLi
wLi+rKi
is the distributive share of labor in the income of sector i. We can now state,









1−θL2. When elasticities of substitution are the same across industries (i.e. σ1 = σ2),
then an increase in p1 r e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s ei nc o n ﬂict if and only if industry 1 is relatively
capital intensive (i.e. θL1 <θ L2).
Proof: See Appendix.
22This proposition provides a clear condition under which a change in international prices
would result in an increase in conﬂict. For example, if the elasticities of substitution are the
same in both productive sectors, an increase in p1 r e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s ei nc o n ﬂict if, and
only if, sector one is relatively capital intensive. In addition, if the payments to labor are
e q u a li nb o t hs e c t o r s ,a ni n c r e a s ei np1 r e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s ei nc o n ﬂict if, and only if, sector
one has, in absolute value, a lower elasticity of substitution than sector 2. The reason is that
the lower (in absolute value) the elasticity of substitution of sector 1, the lower the positive
impact of the increase of prices on wages.
This result holds regardless of the fact that an increase in p1 will result in an increase
i nw a g e s . T h ei n c r e a s ei np1 results in an increase in the income of capital (the net eﬀect
of an increase in sector 1 and a decrease in sector 2) that is larger than the increase in
wages. This makes the potential disputable wealth to rise more than wages, in turn making
appropriation activities more attractive to workers. The model with speciﬁcf a c t o r sm a k e s
clear that the main conclusions of this paper do not depend on the sign of the impact of
shocks on wages. Instead, the results depend on the relative impact that shocks have on the
retribution to capital and wages, as this governs the relative movements of the beneﬁts and
costs of conﬂict.
The previous proposition provides an explanation for the curse of natural resources. If
sector 1 produces diamonds, an increase on the price of diamonds will result in an increase
in conﬂict if this sector is highly capital intensive or displays a low elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital compared to the rest of the economy.
But is it also the case that an increase in the speciﬁc endowment of the diamond industry
(i.e. rough diamonds) would result in an increase in conﬂict? While in this model it is diﬃcult
to characterize in general the eﬀects of endowment changes on the level of conﬂict, we provide
such results for a Cobb-Douglas economy.
Proposition 11 In a Cobb-Doublas economy, an increase in the endowment of capital of
the capital (labor) intensive sector results in an increase (decrease) of conﬂict.
Proof: See Appendix.
If we see natural resources such as oil or diamonds as speciﬁc capital to extractive ac-
tivities, this section gives an explanation for the curse of natural resources. More resources
increase conﬂict when extraction is a relatively capital intensive activity. Also, the model
can be used to analyze the issue of “conﬂict diamonds”. These are rough diamonds that are
seen to fuel conﬂict because rebel factions have direct access to them and use the revenues
to ﬁnance themselves (see Ross, 2003). As a result, governments and parties concerned with
the diamond trade have engineered a certiﬁcation process within an initiative known as the
23Kimberley process.16 The aim is to stamp out “conﬂict diamonds” and keep them away from
the diamond market. The disturbing implication of our model is that every diamond may
be a “conﬂict diamond”: perfectly legal diamonds that have not been handled by rebels may
also increase conﬂict.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We consider an economic activity we call “appropriation” in the context of the canonic
2x2 general equilibrium model of a small open economy. That activity only redistributes
existing resources towards those engaging in it, and away from the productive industries.
We see appropriation as a basic component of diﬀerent manifestations of social conﬂict,
such as crime or civil war. We prove existence of an equilibrium for the conﬂict-enhanced
economy, and characterize it. Relative to the conﬂict-free benchmark, a conﬂictive society is
more capital intensive, and both workers and capitalists are worse oﬀ. The possibility that
workers may become warriors or criminals hurts everybody.
Our main results involve the comparative statics of that equilibrium. Not all shocks that
tend to make society richer will diminish conﬂict. Rather, favorable shocks to the prices
and the technology of the capital intensive sector will increase conﬂict. What appears to
be a wealth-enhancing shock will only diminish conﬂict when favoring the relatively labor
intensive industry. (The key condition for these results is that the appropriation activity be
more labor intensive than the overall economy—i.e. appropriation could be less labor intensive
than the relatively labor intensive industry.) Our model can then account for apparently
paradoxical sylized facts concerning civil wars. It has been noted that both unfavorable
circumstances (such as droughts) and favorable ones (such as higher availability of natural
resources) increase the likelihood of conﬂict. The ﬁrst piece of evidence can be explained
a st h er e s u l to fn e g a t i v es h o c k sa ﬀecting a labor intensive sector, while the second can be
explained as the result of positive shocks aﬀecting relatively capital intensive activities.
A central theme in our paper is that shocks, aﬀecting factor prices, alter both the costs
and beneﬁts to conﬂict. In particular, aggregate shocks aﬀect both wages and disputable
wealth. This is important to our predictions of how these shocks will aﬀect conﬂict. For
example, when capital is industry-speciﬁc, a positive shock to the capital intensive industry
increases wages but it also increases disputable wealth, resulting in higher, rather than lower,
conﬂict. Thus, although it is known that, all else equal, higher wages will diminish crime,
certain shocks that raise wages may also increase crime, because not all else is equal.
We show the social backlash of increased conﬂict can be so strong as to leave society
16See <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com>.
24worse oﬀ after the realization of a shock that would make a conﬂict-free society richer. The
distortion introduced by the possibility of appropriation activities renders attractive some
policies that would be ineﬃcient in a world where property rights can be perfectly enforced.
Examples are “populist” interventions that tax capital and subsidize labor or that promote
unproductive public employment, forms of trade intervention that go against the free trade
credo, or “national development strategies” that distort the proﬁle of technical innovations
that are adopted by the country’s industry.
Societies often implement policies that economists consider ineﬃcient. Work on the po-
litical economy of endogenous policies (see, inter alia, Stigler, 1971, Peltzman, 1976, Becker,
1983 and Coate and Morris, 1995) has shown that such policies may be shaped by political
constraints, and thus may be “politically eﬃcient”. An analogous case can be made when
a social constraint is incorporated to economic analysis: policies that make no sense in a
socially frictionless world may become attractive to society (and its politicians) in the face
of social conﬂict.
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=[ 1 − A(LA)]w (11)
where Ld
1 and Ld
2 are the demand functions of labor and f1 and f2 are the production functions
in each productive sector.
Totally diﬀerentiating the equilibrium conditions with respect to p1 and solving (and










































































where YK denotes the income of capital.

















































dw a r en e g a t i v e .T h el e f th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 1 3 )i sn e g a t i v eb yt h e
concavity of A and the equilibrium condition of the appropriation sector. The right hand
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Proof of Proposition 11. Let q1 = Kα
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From the equilibrium conditions it follows that multiplying p1 for a factor ∆ will have
the same eﬀect on the equilibrium value of the endogenous variables than multiplying K1
for a factor ∆
1
α. Therefore, noting that in this case σ1 = σ2 = −1, θL1 = α and θL2 = β,t h e
result follows from Proposition 10.¥
The case when appropriation employs labor and capital
We now show that the results of the paper also hold when both capital and labor are used
in the appropriation sector under the condition that this sector is labor intensive relative to
the whole economy. Consider the economy from section 2 with the only diﬀerence that now
t h ea m o u n to fa p p r o p r i a t i o ni sA(LA,K A)[p1q1 + q2]. We assume that the appropriation
sector combines labor and capital in amounts that minimize the cost of a given amount
of appropriation and that, as before, A(LA,K A) presents decreasing returns to scale. In








+ w(L − LA)
¤
=[ 1 −A(LA,K A)]wLA+[1−A(LA,K A)]rKA. (14)
We study next how changes in prices aﬀect the level of activity of the appropriation
sector.
Proposition 12 An increase in the price of the capital intensive output results in an increase





if and only if the appropriation
























the demands of capital and labor of the appropriation sector given the level of appropriation
and the ratio of factor prices.
26Remember that by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Lemma 1)
d r
w
dp1 is positive and we
c a nf o c u so nt h es i g no f dA
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´. The denominator is
negative given that, because of A(.) having decreasing returns to scale, the average cost is





As in Section 4, changes in technology can be studied in a way analogous to the one just
used to study price changes. Another source of variation in the level of conﬂict is changes
in endowments. As discussed in section 4.2, studying the eﬀect of changes in the total
endowment of resources that may participate in the appropriation sector requires that we
redeﬁne the appropriation technology so as to consider both the amount of the resource in
the appropriation sector and that in the rest of the economy. Otherwise, as the total amount
of the resource grows, the appropriation sector would grow as well up to the point in which
it takes over the whole economy. We then deﬁne appropriation as a function of the share of
each resource in the appropriation technology, i.e. A(kA,l A) where kA =
KA
K and lA =
LA
L .
It is interesting to note that the impact of an increase in the total endowment of one factor
depends on the factor intensity of the appropriation sector.



































are the demands of capital and labor of the appropriation sector given the
level of appropriation, the price of inputs and total factor endowments. Diﬀerentiating

























































´. The denominator is negative given that by decreasing returns




K and the result for changes in K follows. By symmetry we have that dA
dL < 0




27The extension of the results in section 5 to the case in which both capital and labor are
used in appropriation follow from the previous two propositions.
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